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Abstract:  
 
The purpose of this paper is to uncover behind the trends in corruption cases in Indonesia’s 
public sector. This study examines 1,192 selected corruption-related court decisions in the 
period of 2001–2015 based on the behavioural perspective.  
 
This study found that corruption offenders of high level of seniority were more destructive to 
the country’s economy compared to their younger less experienced counterparts. 
Additionally, compared to the real experience in the workplace, education does not seem to 
give offenders more advantages when committing their offences.  
 
This paper demonstrates how the seemingly small and insignificant behavioural clues may 
become effective tools to predict and to prevent the occurrence of corruption in the future. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Corruption is a problem of multiple dimensions necessitating multi-dimensional 
approaches to cope with (Ageeva, Anoschenkova, Petrikova, & Pomnina, 2016). For 
this, understanding the behavioural elements of corruption is fundamental in 
developing an effective anti-corruption strategy. This is so since like any other types 
of fraud; corruption is essentially a human endeavour which involves deception, 
intention, desire and the risk of apprehension all of which are taken into 
consideration in offenders’ decision-making process (Ramamoorti, Morrison, 
Koletar, & Pope, 2013).  
 
In Indonesia, different governments result in different kinds of corruption due to 
presumably different bad leadership styles. For example, when Soeharto was in 
power, despite the rampant corruption, economic growth was evident in Indonesia 
whereas in other corrupt countries this has never been the case. In the post-Soeharto 
era, a different kind of corruption emerged. Due to the more diffused nature of 
power and authority of the time (i.e. the decentralization system), the once 
centralized corruption became more fragmented and decentralized. In short, as 
suggested by various cases, the migration to the decentralization system has made 
corruption even worse (Kuncoro, 2006). Another problem that arises from the 
decentralization system is the seemingly rising number of budget misallocation cases 
throughout the country uncovered by the authorities. For example, the audits by the 
Supreme Audit Board (BPK) in 2010 revealed that travel – related expense misuses 
within 35 minister offices and other agencies were estimated to be around Rp. 73.5 
billion (USD 5.8 million) (Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency, 2011, p. 7). 
Based on the same audits in the first semester of 2011, the figure rose to Rp. 89.5 
billion (USD 7.1 million) across 44 minister offices and agencies (Indonesian Forum 
for Budget Transparency, 2011). This is believed to have been caused by the 
pressures brought to bear on politicians by the new decentralized system to maintain 
power.  
 
Like a disease, corruption seems to affect more and more people by the day even 
those who seem outwardly honest and religious. Therefore, the need to understand 
the root of corruption is eminent as it is not just a legal problem but more of a 
multidimensional one. Such patterns will then be assessed to determine the causes of 
the problem as well as how to cope with it. In the case of corruption in Indonesia, we 
believe that it is being influenced by factors such as large amount of public resources, 
competing vested interests and politically connected networks, poorly paid civil 
servants, low regulatory quality and weak judicial independence (Syamsudin, 
Sriyana, & Prabowo, 2012). These were accompanied by wide discretionary power 
and resources and lack of proper accountability and enforcement mechanisms have 
made Indonesia a breeding ground for corruption among public officials. This study 
is part of the efforts to seek for the solution for the corruption problem in Indonesia 
by understanding the behaviour of corruptors. By examining court decisions related 
to corruption from the Supreme Court of Indonesia as well as corruption data from 
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other agencies, this study attempts to identify the behavioural patterns of corruption 
in Indonesia. 
 
2. Related Literature  
 
In the 1990s, corruption, despite its broad definition, has attracted a great deal of 
attention (Tanzi, 1998, p. 559). Today, corruption becomes one of the most widely 
studied issues in social science. Nevertheless, so far as historical evidences are 
concerned, corruption may well be as old as human civilization itself. Although 
corruption has been around for generations, one question remains: Why would the 
otherwise good people engage in corruption? The answer is because it is perceived 
as a logical choice for solving the perceived problems faced by the offenders 
(Syamsudin, Sriyana, & Prabowo, 2012). 
 
The problem of corruption has been analysed from various perspectives such as law, 
politics and economy. For example, from the economic perspective, corruption may 
be associated as selling government property by government officials (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993). In practice, there are often differences in the definition of corruption 
across legal systems due to which an offence that is legal in one country may 
constitute corruption in another. In Indonesia, as stipulated by the Law No. 31 Year 
1999 as amended by the Law No 20 Year 2001 on the Eradication of Corruption, 
there are seven categories of offences that constitute corruption: acts that cause 
losses to the nation; bribery; occupational embezzlement; extortion; deception; 
conflict of interests in procurement of goods and services; and gratification.  
 
Corruption is a multidimensional problem experienced by many countries around the 
world (Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2014). It varies across the world in different intensity 
and impact to the economy (Suryanto and Ridwansyah, 2016). Various factors have 
been identified as the major causes of corruption in the world (Galooyek et al., 
2014). Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) pointed out that democratization and 
decentralization are among the main factors influencing corruption in some 
transitional developing countries. The democratization process in some countries 
gave positive impact on corruption prevention. Meanwhile, decentralization 
increases significantly corruption in the aftermath of decentralization. Moreover, a 
successful democratization process in several countries is associated with lower 
corruption levels (Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005). 
 
The size of government was believed by Montinola and Jackman (2002) to influence 
corruption, meanwhile Gerring and Thacker (2005) argued that government 
regulations also affect to the size of corruption. The change of government size can 
also be affected by the democratization and development process within the nation. 
As national income increases the demand for public goods and services may also 
grow significantly. Consequently, the size of government will expand to fulfil public 
requirement of government services. In such a condition, there will be an increase in 
government spending which may provide corruption opportunity to the bureaucrats.  
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Decentralization is an important aspect that might affect the quality of public 
services in various ways as well as the quality of the government itself. Fan, Lin and 
Triesman (2009) and Asthana (2012) found that decentralization could be associated 
with increasing corruption in most countries. Decentralization policy increases the 
complexity of government bureaucracy in providing public goods and services. 
Moreover, decentralization also induces horizontal and vertical structural 
competition among bureaucrats. Poor coordination between central and local 
governments will also lead to increasing corruption. As noted by Fan et al. (2009) 
countries with a larger number of administrative units were reported to have more 
frequent bribery and thus higher costs for businesses. Evidence suggests that the 
effect of this larger government size was more pronounced in the developing 
countries than in the developed ones. The effect of higher sub national government 
employment was especially strong in developing countries. Generally, there was a 
strong connection between bureaucracy and corruption among the developing 
countries. In fact, higher central government was often associated with less frequent 
reported bribery in the developing countries (Baldacchino et al., 2017). 
 
Essien (2012) pointed out that corruption which is closely related to the behaviour of 
the bureaucrats is often labelled as a bureaucratic corruption or administrative 
corruption. The corrupt bureaucrats and their collaborators are commonly involved 
in the pricing schemes for public goods and services (Setyawati et al., 2017). The 
prices are associated with cost of public goods and services provision which 
represent the bureaucrat and administrative efficiency. Some government services 
may be highly inelastic, while others may have greater elasticity. In the case of high 
demand for the services, the provision cost tends to increase and thus limiting public 
to access. Such situation could potentially create administrative corruption in public 
services activities (Fan, Lin, & Treisman, 2009). Administrative corruption 
generally occurs in areas such as police stations, taxing and licensing offices, 
hospitals, immigration offices, customs offices, just to name a few. 
 
The other factors that may affect the increasing corruption are institutional setting 
and development process. Evidence suggests that liberalization affects the 
relationship between economic openness and corruption among developing countries 
(Bose & Pandey, 2009). This finding was also supported by Ata and Arvas (2011) 
who suggested that economic development and economic freedom are main the 
determinants of corruption among 25 European countries. Moreover, they also 
pointed out that economic development, inflation, economic freedom and income 
distribution were statistically significant determinants for corruption. Furthermore, 
in the periods of economic booming as GDP per capita rises, corruption declines. On 
the contrary, in the periods of high inflation and skew income distribution, 
corruption rises. The paper also noted that economic growth was insignificant to the 
corruption. Corruption has negative impact on the welfare of poor and rich countries 
(Mariyono, 2012). Nevertheless, its impact on low income countries is more 
destructive. Meanwhile, natural resource endowment and trade also have significant 
impacts for these low-income countries. He also concluded that corruption seems to 
 Preventing Corruption in the Indonesian Public Sector 
 
542 
 
be more chronic in developing countries, because of unstable institutional factors. 
Moreover, the impact of decreased corruption in low income countries is greater 
than that in high income countries. As argued by Asthana (2012), the change of 
institutional size that was marked by the decentralization policy leads to increase 
corruption significantly in the immediate aftermath of decentralization. Since the 
decentralization changes the role of bureaucracy to the public services, it increases 
tension of corruption. This paper is an attempt to develop an appropriate policy for 
corruption eradication in Indonesia by using Cressey’s (1950) Fraud Triangle theory. 
 
3. Analytical Framework 
 
For analytical purposes, this study gathered 1,192 corruption related court decisions 
from the Supreme Court (MA) in the period of 2001 - 2015. As the end of 2015, the 
Supreme Court has ruled in over 1,600 corruptions related cases. However, this 
study analysed only 1,192 cases with complete and accessible information. This 
study excludes cases where the alleged offenders were found not guilty by the court. 
The analysis on offender’s age, education and financial losses are based on the 985 
selected offenders with individual estimation (stated in courts’ decisions) of the 
losses caused by their offences. 
 
Fraud occurs when a potential offender is exposed to three fraud causal factors 
(pressure/motivation, opportunity and rationalization) and about those factors 
believes that the perceived net benefits (perceived benefits minus perceived costs) of 
committing fraud exceeds those of not committing it. In Indonesia, bribery is often 
considered to reduce uncertainty in business due to which it is considered as a 
common expense in doing business in the country (Prabowo, 2014). For example, 
corrupt public officials may grant a large government project to an otherwise 
unqualified vendor simply because he or she is the highest bidder in bribes (Kuncoro, 
2006).  
 
Just like in the professional life, fraud triangle may also occur in one’s early 
academic life. In terms of pressure, as evidenced by various academic crime cases 
during the National Exam in Indonesia, the high entry requirements of top schools 
and universities appears to have created a pressure for students to cheat in the exam 
(Malgwi & Rakovski, 2009). Complimented by the lack of supervision and the 
notion that the ends (i.e. being accepted in reputable schools or universities) justifies 
the means, many students in Indonesia have no second thought in participating in 
academic fraud. 
 
As a type of fraud, the occurrence of corruption can be explained with the fraud 
triangle approach (Cressey, 1950). He proposed that for fraud to occur three 
elements need to be present: pressure or motivation, opportunity, and rationalization. 
Pressure/motivation may come in the form of financial difficulties or in more than a 
few cases, greed. However, many also believe that financial pressure can be a 
subjective matter. Many wealthy people ended up in prison for fraudulent acts to 
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accumulate more wealth from their positions in their organizations. As a symbol of 
greed, extravagant lifestyle which can be recognized from the comparison between 
one’s personal assets with his or her potential income often indicate greed instead of 
need as the driving factor behind his or her fraud (Topcu et al., 2015). Opportunity is 
commonly associated with power and authorities in organizations where potential 
offenders work. One’s unusually close association with vendor or customer, for 
example, may indicate misuse of power and authorities associated with one’s 
position in an organization. In many cases of fraud, opportunity is viewed differently 
by different potential offenders depending on their mental capacity. Smart offenders 
will likely be able to see more opportunity than the less intellectually gifted ones. 
When a person is misusing his or her position for personal gain, he or she will tend 
to exhibit defensiveness along with suspiciousness and irritability due to fears that 
others might eventually find out about the fraud. Rationalization is essentially what 
makes fraud different from street crimes. It is the way fraud offenders justify their 
acts so as to avoid feeling guilty. Fraud offenders have been known to be smart 
people who are not only capable of fooling others but also themselves into thinking 
that their acts are legitimate. In many cases of fraud eight common types of denials 
to rationalize offenders’ acts are: denial of legality, denial of responsibility, denial of 
injury, denial of victim, social weighting, appeal to higher loyalties, metaphor of the 
ledger and refocusing attention (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). By using fraud triangle 
framework, this study assesses common factors that drive public officials to engage 
in corrupt acts. In principle, once identified, eliminating these corruption causal 
factors will become a priority in eradicating corruption in Indonesia. However, 
before we analyse using fraud triangle, we used mean hypothesis test to analysis the 
difference loss caused by age, education and institution of offenders. The 
understanding of the factors that cause corruption will serve as a basis for 
government and other decision makers in designing the most appropriate strategy for 
eradicating corruption. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1. Trends of Corruption in Indonesia 
There are various kinds of corruption in Indonesia from petty corruption to grand 
schemes involving groups of people with power. Before devising a strategy, it is 
important for anti-corruption practitioners to get a clear picture of the current trends 
of the corruption problem in Indonesia. Based on the data on corruption offenders 
gathered for this study, the following analysis was performed. 
 
The result of the test of equality on the average losses from corruption suggests that 
there is indeed a significant difference between age groups in terms of losses from 
corrupt acts. From the analysed data the largest portion of losses are contributed by 
offenders aged 31-35 and 36-40. This suggests that corruption offenders at the age of 
31 – 40 can cause substantial losses to the nation. Additionally, the statistical 
analysis on the level of offenders’ education suggests that there is no significant 
difference across different levels of education in terms of losses from corrupt acts. 
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This means that offenders who never went to college can cause as much financial 
damages to the nation as those with undergraduate or even postgraduate degrees. 
Finally, statistical analysis also shows that there are no significant differences in 
terms of losses from corruption offences among offenders from three occupational 
groups (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Mean Hypothesis Testing of Average Losses from Corruption for Time 
Series Cumulative Data, 2001-2015. 
Variables 
Measurement 
Mean of Losses 
(Trilion Rupiah) 
F-Statistic Probability Inference 
Age < 30 1.17 
3.099286 
 
 
0.0133* 
 
 
 
 
Reject Ho 
31-35 2.17 
36-40 3.01 
41-45 1.52 
46-50 1.20 
>51 1.72 
Education Senior High School 3.22 
0.842807 
 
0.4388 
 
 
Accept Ho Under Graduate 2.03 
Post graduate 3.48 
Institution Executive 1.77  
0.996295 
 
0.3784 
 
Accept Ho Legislative 2.89 
Private 2.45 
Notes:   1. Ho: Mean of Losses is equal; Ha: Mean of Losses is not equal. 
             2. * Denotes significant at 0.05 level. 
 
The results are particularly interested in which fraud offenders with high education 
are causing more financial damages than those with low education. A possible 
explanation for this is that the numerous loopholes in the Indonesian bureaucratic 
system create numerous opportunities for many people to easily commit corruption 
despite their low education. The existing organizational culture within the 
government in Indonesia that condones corruption is another factor that constitutes 
the ease of doing corruption in the country. In terms of age, we found that offenders 
at the age of 31 – 45 are causing the highest losses from their offences. The 
widespread corruption culture in most if not all systems in the government has 
created abundant opportunity for people with positions regardless of whether they 
are part of the bureaucrats, parliament members or even those from private sector. 
 
The Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) categorizes corruption 
offences into seven categories: goods and services procurement, licensing, bribery, 
unauthorized collection, budget misallocation, money laundering and hindering 
KPK’s investigation. Based on KPK’s investigation data, up until October 2014, 
bribery appears to be the most prevalent type of corruption in Indonesia. Around 45% 
of the corruption cases in the past decade are in this category. Goods and services 
procurement cases which has brought down many high ranking public officials is the 
second most common corruption type in the country. 
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In 2014, KPK has arrested 8 heads of agencies/ministers, 7 mayors/regents and vice-
mayors/vice-regents and 2 judges for corruption (Corruption Eradication 
Commission, 2014). In the period of 2004 – 2014, around 40 mayors/regents and 
vice-mayors/vice-regents in Indonesia have been arrested and/or prosecuted for 
corruption (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2014). In the same period, around 
75 members of central and regional parliaments were arrested by the KPK for 
corruption (Corruption Eradication Commission, 2014). 
 
Based on the data from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), 24% of 
corruption offenders under the commission’s investigation in the period of 2004 – 
2014 work for private sectors but the largest group of offenders are higher echelon 
public officials (26%). These can be explained by the fact that 45% of corruption 
offences investigated by the KPK fall under the category of bribery where it is 
common, for example, for private sector business to bribe public officials to make 
things happen and/or to make things happen faster.  
 
From 985 selected corruption convicts prosecuted by the Supreme Court, on average 
an offender with a diploma or an undergraduate degree caused around Rp 3.2 billion 
(USD 253,366) of financial losses to the state from his or her crime. This figure is 
lower compared to those who never went to college (Rp 5.8 billion or USD 459,226) 
and those who had a postgraduate degree (Rp 4.5 billion or USD 356,296) (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Mean of Losses based on Offenders’ Education 
 
 
From the selected convicts, in terms of age, it appears that offenders who are older 
than 50 years old contributed the largest part of the total losses to the state in the past 
thirteen years. 52 percent of the estimated total losses of Rp. 4.4 trillion (USD 348.4 
million) were contributed by this age group. Additionally, for each convicted 
offender older than 50 years old, Indonesia will suffer at least Rp. 6.1 billion (USD 
482,978) of financial losses (Figure 2). This is can be explained by the fact that the 
older a corruption offender is, the more experienced and thus capable he or she is to 
identify loopholes in the system that can be exploited for personal benefits. This may 
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suggest that one’s ability to commit corruption in Indonesia is developed from 
experience more than education.  
 
Figure 2: Average Losses from Corruption based on Age of Offenders 
 
 
In terms of institutions where the offence took place, 45 percent of all corruption 
cases occurred at ministries or agencies. This is supported by the fact that several 
ministers from the previous government were named suspects in corruption cases by 
the KPK. For example, just before the beginning of presidential campaign season in 
2014, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) again surprised the public by 
naming then religious affairs minister as a suspect in the alleged misuse of the fund 
for haj pilgrims. The commission believed that existing “red flags” were enough to 
launch a full-scale investigation into the matter.  This has drawn public’s attention as 
in the past two years alone; two active ministers from the Religious Affairs Ministry 
have been declared graft suspects, not to mention several other high-ranking public 
officials (Prabowo, 2014). 
 
4.2. Understanding the Roots of Corruption in Indonesian Bureaucracy 
Rationalizing corruption is a process that needs to be learned over time by an 
offender. Unfortunately, among the first places fraud rationalization begins to grow 
in one’s mind is within the educational institutions. Some of these acts were even 
captured by television cameras and broadcast nationally. The fact that many 
corruption offenders hold diploma or undergraduate degrees may suggest that the 
Indonesian education system has not paid much attention on developing future 
professionals’ so-called “moral grammar”. With the absence of strong moral 
grammar, the seed of fraud rationalization will continue to grow throughout 
adulthood up to the point where an individual no longer able to tell the right from the 
wrong. As discussed above, from the selected corruption convicts, offenders above 
50 years old caused the largest part of losses from corruption in Indonesia.  
J. Sriyana, H.Y. Prabowo, M. Syamsudin 
 
547 
 
In addition to being the largest group of corruption offenders, the “above fifty” 
group also poses the greatest financial threat to the economy primarily due to the 
estimated financial losses they have caused. It is always interesting to see why so 
many senior public officials decided to commit corruption. As mentioned above, 
fraud rationalization does not grow overnight and it often takes a lifetime to nurture 
in which education is an influential factor. As depicted by Figure 2, 26 percent 
of corruption offenders investigated or prosecuted  by the KPK was from the  higher 
echelon group which  represents  high ranking senior public officials. According to 
Kristiansen and Ramli (2006),it iscommon in Indonesia that civil servant positions 
are subject to hidden market transactions due to the demand for stable sources of 
income. The lack of transparency in the recruitment system  has created  opportunity 
for positions in the government to be treated as a product that can be bought and sold.
Typically, a position becomes an expensive product whenever its compensation is 
good and many projects are available (Kristiansen & Ramli, 2006). Therefore, it is 
no surprise that when a senior public official attains his or her position through 
unlawful means, he or she will perceive that fraud is a normal part of doing work. 
Such a notion will eventually lead to corrupt acts. In Indonesia, the term “Money 
Politics” is a household phrase which refers to a practice of accepting bribes and 
distributing money to obtain or maintain position (Mietzner, 2007). This has created 
market for rent-seeking activities for obtaining personal gain. This was worsened by 
the need for political party financing by the state after the fall of Soeharto where 
such financing has been reduced and thus created more pressure for political parties 
to obtain funding from other sources including their politician who sit in the 
government (Mietzner, 2007). Experts believe fraudulent behaviour, including that 
of public officials, is mainly influenced by the organizational culture of their 
institutions which, after years of individuals being exposed to it, reshapes their 
perception of fraud (Alatas, Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, & Gangadharan, 2009; 
Matsueda, 2006). A major part of organizational culture is the leadership that serves 
as the “tone at the top” that everyone must follow. Bad leadership, on the other hand, 
will create a fertile ground for fraud (Prabowo, 2014). 
 
Leadership has been identified by anti-fraud experts as a determining factor for 
Fraud Triangle elements within an organization. Leadership style will influence the 
propensity of fraud to occur within an organization or even a country. The role of 
leadership in corruption has been an evolution of processes of transformation from 
caution, honesty, respect and valuing others to the thrill and excitement of 
selfishness, narcissistic and omnipotent gratuity (Zyglidopoulos, Fleming, & 
Rothenberg, 2009; Eicher, García-Peñalosa, & Ypersele, 2009; Ramamoorti, 
Morrison, Koletar, & Pope, 2013). Former leaders of giant corporations and some 
country leaders have been deemed modern day incarnations of Narcissus. A good 
leader must possess moral strength, perception and empathy and is a role model for 
his or her people. Unfortunately, some individuals in leadership positions are simply 
not cut out to lead.  
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Much fraud involving high ranking public officials could have been prevented had 
the Indonesian people known about how to spot and identify their behavioural 
symptoms in the first place. After numerous corruption cases involving, among 
others, House of Representatives members of the previous government, many 
Indonesians regretted have voted for the corrupt politicians. The high number of 
corruption cases involving high-ranking government officials in the executive, 
legislative and judicative institutions suggests that the existing leader selection 
process remains ineffective in producing leaders with integrity. Therefore, due to 
public participation in the process, general and regional elections serve strategic 
roles in securing good leadership for the country (Corruption Eradication 
Commission, 2013). This also signifies the need for enhancing people’s awareness 
regarding the traits of good leaders.  
 
4.3. Preventing Corruption in the Government Bureaucracy 
For years, corruption in Indonesia has been considered as a legal problem. Realizing 
that corruption is a multi-dimensional problem is the first important step toward 
eradicating it. The eradication of corruption should be teamwork among various 
elements of the society which includes areas such as prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution. Only countries that can fully optimize its people’s 
participation can effectively combat corruption problem. Corruption will always be a 
problem in Indonesia if it is considered as a rational choice of action. Despite its 
complexity, many scholars believe that corruption is essentially an outcome of a 
decision-making process by potential offenders in which several variables are taken 
into consideration before the decision is made. Many criminologists believe that 
offenders are always seeking for the greatest benefits in their actions as an 
application of the rational choice theory (Hayward, 2007). 
 
A common measure of a rational action is when it’s perceived benefits exceed its 
perceived costs. For example, in Indonesia, the punishment for corruptors is 
considered very light compared to other countries. According to the Indonesia 
Corruption Watch (ICW), for example, in the first semester of 2014, the average 
sentence for corruption offenders is only 2 years and nine months. This is believed 
to have created a notion among potential corruption offenders that the benefits (e.g. 
money, positions, etc.) of corruption far outweigh its costs (e.g. risk of detection and 
prosecution). Prabowo (2014) argued that understanding potential offenders’ 
perceived cost-benefit weighing process is a key in changing public perception 
regarding the “profitability” of corruption which will eventually create a notion that 
corruption is an irrational choice of action.  
 
Moral grammar is essentially one’s ability to tell the right from the wrong. Scholars 
have long been debating as to how one’s moral grammar is formed. Some believe 
that it is genetic, some suggest that it is a product of interaction with other people in 
the society, and others are convinced that it is a combination of both (Hales, 2009). 
Regardless of the debates, education is often thought as a determining factor behind 
the formation of an individual’s moral grammar. Stone (2011) argued that the human 
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resource quality of the professionals is largely depending on the quality of the 
education they previously received. Such quality also includes one’s morality to 
prevent him or her to become a fraud offender. Schools and universities hold an 
important role in building future practitioners’ moral grammar. For this, they first 
need to become fraud-free places for young minds to grow.  This is so since 
exposure to corruption daily will eventually promote a tolerance and thus an 
acceptance of corruption which will be part of norms of behaviour (Alatas, Cameron, 
Chaudhuri, Erkal, & Gangadharan, 2009).  
 
Integrating moral grammar development into the existing education system can be 
an effective means to diminish future corruption. Students must learn not only about 
how to become a skilled professional but also about being an honest and accountable 
person. More attention needs to be given to education as a means for combating 
corruption. Staats, Hupp, and Hagley (2008) believed regardless of its importance, 
academic honesty has not got enough attention from scholars and researchers. The 
importance of education lays in the fact that academic misconduct and various forms 
of cheating are related to one another as well as to other forms of misconducts 
(Blankenship & Whitley, 2000). Many believe the rampant corruption in Indonesia 
to be a natural outcome of the low quality of moral education in the country as 
evidenced by, among others, the numerous academic misconducts during the annual 
National Examinations. The weak character strength complemented by the 
increasing technological opportunities, modelling, rewards, and low probability of 
punishment makes cheating a logical choice for students who wish to get good 
grades (Staats, Hupp, & Hagley, 2008). With intensive moral grammar education, 
there will be shifting in future professionals’ mindset which will make fraud such as 
corruption no longer a logical choice. 
 
4.4.  Good Leadership 
Many major fraud cases in the world occurred because of bad leaders and bad 
leadership. Bad leaders tend to put their personal interests above everything else and 
committed fraud to achieve their goals. When it comes to selecting leaders, 
everybody expects them to bring about positive changes to an organization or even 
to a country. However, as evidenced by various corruption cases perpetrated by 
many high ranking public officials, Indonesia still has a long way to go in building a 
good leadership. It is important for the people to avoid giving supports to potentially 
corrupt leaders.  
 
Even though the Indonesian people do not want to support bad leaders, they often 
failed to recognize such leaders until it was too late. In principle, good leaders are 
those who can find strategies that serve all stakeholders well. They prefer to 
influence than to coerce and they always choose to encourage rather than to resist 
changes (Allio, 2007). Among the traits of a bad leader is the so-called “narcissism” 
which essentially reflects a distorted view of the self (Takala, 2010). Such leaders 
may become intolerant of criticism, unwilling to compromise and frequently 
surround themselves sycophants. 
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Good leaders must exhibit integrity as well as proficiency in carrying out their duties 
(Allio, 2007). In the case of the former Chief of Indonesian National Police, 
Hoegeng Iman Santoso, for example, is among finest role model for a good 
leadership in Indonesia. He always set good examples to his subordinates regarding 
integrity, honesty and dedication. During his tenure as the Chief of Indonesian 
National Police, he had been seen standing on the street directing traffic in his 
Kapolri uniform (Santoso, Sutrisno, Sirait, & Hasibuan, 2009). Hoegeng believed 
that regardless of one’s position, a police’s primary duty is to serve the public. 
Furthermore, according to Hoegeng, when serving the public, some common police 
and a police general are essentially the same. Whereas a bad leader can manipulate 
and misguide people into committing fraud, a good leader in an organization will 
shape and meld organization members’ mindsets to be more appreciative of 
transparency and accountability (Takala, 2010).  
 
4.5. Organizational Culture 
Organizational culture plays an important role in shaping organization members’ 
attitude towards fraud. For example, narcissistic leaders may eventually shape their 
organizations to be narcissistic as well. An excessively narcissistic organization is 
often unable to behave ethically due to its lack of moral identity (Duchon & Drake, 
2009). The problem with corrupt organizational culture may start with the so-called 
“bad apple” problem where generally there is an individual who commits corruption 
without the support from his or her colleagues or organization. In many cases, this 
type of offender found a hole in the system and then decided to commit a fraud 
(Ramamoorti, Morrison, Koletar, & Pope, 2013). Later, when he or she realizes that, 
compared to the payoffs, the likelihood of being detected and caught is low, he or 
she continues the fraud. Just like a disease, offender will infect other organization 
members to systematically commit fraud in a group and eventually everybody is 
participating in the fraud. 
 
The corruption problem in Indonesia is represented by the systematic corruption 
involving many public officials from the previous (Murharsito, Fauziah, Kristijadi, 
& Iramani, 2017). As an organization, there is a social structure with every 
government agency. Such a structure is imposed on and upheld by organization 
members who essentially make the institution encoded into every member through 
socialization process (Duchon & Drake, 2009).  By means of internalization, such 
process is later transformed into patterned behaviour (Duchon & Drake, 2009). 
Generally, social structure within an organization is initially established by its 
leaders. Any member who does not submit to this structure will likely be exiled by 
others. When corruption is embedded into an organization’s social structure, many 
of the otherwise honest organization members will be forced to see corrupt practices 
as usual. When this happens, despite one’s understanding and appreciation of 
corruption’s costs, it can readily become an unwritten rule of competition (Collins, 
Uhlenbruck, & Rodriguez, 2009; Brass, Butterﬁeld , & Skaggs, 1998; Oliver, 1997). 
Therefore, building a positive organizational culture is best started from the leaders 
as they will shape the mindset of the entire organization members.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
The complexity of the corruption problem requires decision makers to devise a 
multi-layered strategy to solve it. The corruption problem in Indonesia remains 
serious and continues to erode the society. A major factor behind the entrenched 
corruption is the fact that it is considered by many as a logical choice of action for 
achieving goals and objectives. The high expected payoffs and the perceived low 
chances of detection and prosecution are among the factors considered by offenders 
when deciding to engage in corrupt practices. Organizational culture is a major 
factor that influences corruption offenders’ decision-making process. Such culture is 
commonly established and maintained by leaders within the organizations which 
highlight the fact that leadership is a key factor that will shape an organization and 
the people within it to be either corrupt or accountable. Prior to one’s professional 
life, education is also an influential factor to one’s moral grammar development 
which enables him or her to tell the right from the wrong. Many believe that the 
chronic corruption in Indonesia is an indication of the failure of the nation’s 
education system. Therefore, rebuilding the education system must be among the top 
priorities in eradicating corruption in Indonesia. Finally, to create the perception that 
corruption is an irrational choice of action, the existing legal system should provide 
sufficient deterrence effect for future offenders. 
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